Reference
Glossary
Plain-language definitions for the key terms used across Everstrat documentation.
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| EVE | The protocol's ERC-20 token. Each EVE represents a proportional share of the total NAV. You receive EVE when you deposit ETH and burn it when you exit. |
| NAV (net asset value) | The total ETH value of everything the protocol holds — across the AMM, Controller, StrategyManager, and all deployed yield strategies. NAV divided by EVE supply gives the base price. |
| Base price | The redemption value of one EVE, calculated as NAV / EVE supply. This is the price used when you exit. |
| Premium price | The entry price for one EVE, calculated as NAV / (EVE supply × connector weight). Because connector weight is less than 1, the premium price is higher than the base price. You pay the premium price when you deposit. |
| Connector weight | A parameter (greater than 0 and up to 1 inclusive, stored as a fraction of 1e18) that controls the spread between the base price and the premium price. A lower connector weight means a larger premium on entry. The default is 0.9 (90%). |
| Bonding curve | The mathematical relationship between NAV, EVE supply, and connector weight that determines the entry (premium) and exit (base) prices. It ensures the entry price is always at least as high as the redemption price. |
| Batch | A group of queued exit requests that the keeper prices and processes together. Each batch has a single price applied to all requests in it. |
| Exit queue | The mechanism that holds exit requests that cannot be settled immediately because the AMM does not have enough free ETH. Requests wait in a batch until the keeper processes them. |
| Escape hatch | The ability to cancel a queued exit after 3 days have passed since the batch was priced, if the keeper has not yet processed it. Cancelling returns your EVE. |
| Performance fee | A configurable bps rate (max 20%, MAX_PERFORMANCE_FEE_BPS = 2000, enforced on the StrategyManager) applied to the accrued Uniswap V3 LP trading fees a strategy has earned. The fee is settled by minting EVE to the DAO treasury via bonding-curve dilution (evesToMint = (feeETH × supply) / (totalNAV − feeETH)), not by moving ETH out of the protocol. |
| Bonding-curve dilution | The mechanism used both for premium-priced deposits and for performance-fee settlement: new EVE is minted at a rate that slightly reduces every existing holder's share of NAV. |
| Keeper | An automated bot or multisig that holds the KEEPER_ROLE. The keeper prices exit batches (at the AMM's base price, not an oracle price), processes them, and performs other routine maintenance tasks. |
| Immediate vs queued redemption | An exit is immediate if the AMM has enough free ETH to pay you right away. It is queued if it cannot — your request enters the exit queue and you receive ETH after the keeper processes the batch. |
| Claim (pull-over-push) | After a queued exit is processed, ETH is credited to your claimable balance rather than sent directly to you. You must call claim() to withdraw it. This prevents failed transfers from blocking batch processing. |
| priceTolerance | A parameter you set when submitting a queued exit. If the final batch price has fallen more than this fraction below the price at request time, the protocol closes your request for slippage and returns your EVE instead of paying out ETH. |
| minTokensToMint | A parameter you set when depositing. If the AMM would mint fewer EVE than this floor (due to price movement between submission and execution), the transaction reverts rather than settling at an unexpected price. |
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